

Lesson Objective: Comprehend the basic principles and factors shaping US National Security Strategy and Policy.

Acronyms:

NSS National Security Strategy
NMS National Military Strategy

Desired Learning Outcomes:

1. Summarize the principles that support the six strategic priorities that conclude the 1997 NSS.

Six NSS strategic priorities - summary

- Foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe
- Forge a strong and stable Asia Pacific community
- Build a new, open trading system for the twenty-first century - one that benefits America and the world
- Keep America the leading force for peace
- Increase cooperation in confronting security threats that disregard national borders
- Strengthen the diplomatic and military tools required to address these challenges

In my view, the first five are goals. The last one relates to having the resources to achieve those goals, and implies a plan to attain those resources. *“Diplomatic and military tools” may not be limited to American capabilities, but include transnational and other nation’s capabilities and cooperation.*

The strategies of Primacy, Selective Engagement, and Cooperative Security all find some expression within these priorities. Notice that neo-isolationism does not find a place in current American National Security Strategy.

The line between domestic and foreign policy continues to blur. We can only preserve our security and well-being at home by being actively involved in the world beyond our borders. (205)

In general, we seek a world in which no critical region is dominated by a power hostile to the US and regions of greatest importance to the US are stable and at peace. (207)

Core values of representative democracy and market economics

Core objectives are

- enhancing security
- promoting prosperity
- promoting democracy

US National Security Strategy: Introduction

The **goal of national security** to ensure the protection of our nation's fundamental and enduring needs is three-fold (207):

- protect the lives and personal safety of Americans, both at home and abroad
- maintain sovereignty, political freedom, and independence of the United States, with its values, institutions, and territory intact
- provide for the well-being and prosperity of the nation and its people

Core objectives (details)

- **Enhancing security**
 - Need for integrated approaches
 - Shaping the international environment
 - through diplomacy
 - through international assistance
 - through arms control
 - through nonproliferation treaties
 - through military activities
 - Responding to crises
 - respond to the full spectrum of crises that may arise
 - act in alliance or partnership when our interests are shared by others, but unilaterally when compelling national interests so demand
 - **vital interests** - those of broad, overriding importance to the survival, safety, and vitality of our nation
 - important national interests - do not affect our national survival, but do affect our national well-being and the character of the world in which we live
 - humanitarian interests - in the event of natural or manmade disasters or gross violations of human rights, our nation may act because our values demand it
 - Transnational threats
 - terrorism
 - drug trafficking
 - international organized crime
 - environmental and security concerns
 - Smaller-scale contingencies
 - Major theater warfare
 - Preparing now for an uncertain future
- **Promoting prosperity**
 - Enhancing American competitiveness
 - enhancing access to foreign markets
 - export strategy and advocacy program
 - export control reform
 - other economic objectives (bribery and corruption; trade and labor, environmental protection)
 - Strengthening macroeconomic coordination
 - Providing for energy security
 - Promoting sustainable development abroad
- **Promoting democracy**
 - emerging democracies
 - adherence to universal human rights and democratic principles
 - humanitarian assistance

Six NSS strategic priorities (details)

- Foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe
 - Primacy/selective engagement
 - adapting NATO to new demands while enlarging it to take in new members from among Europe's new democracies
- Forge a strong and stable Asia Pacific community
 - Primacy/selective engagement
 - an isolated inward-looking China is not good for America or the world; a China playing its rightful role as a responsible and active member of the international community is.
- Build a new, open trading system for the twenty-first century - one that benefits America and the world
 - Cooperative security
 - we have made it our mission to tear down trade barriers abroad in order to create jobs at home
 - we must build on that momentum, especially in Latin America and Asia; if we fail to act now, these emerging economies will find their economic future with other nations—and we will be left behind
- Keep America the leading force for peace
 - Primacy / *selective engagement*
 - continue to be an unrelenting force for peace
 - taking reasonable risks for peace keeps us from being drawn into far more costly conflicts
 - it encourages other nations to focus on future hopes, not past hatreds; it creates partners willing to seize the opportunities of a new century
- Increase cooperation in confronting security threats that disregard national borders
 - Cooperative security
 - we must continue to move strongly to counter growing dangers to our security: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, drugs, illegal arms trafficking, and environmental damage
- Strengthen the diplomatic and military tools required to address these challenges
 - *Refers to both internal and external diplomatic and military tools??*
 - We must maintain a strong and ready military; we will achieve this by selectively increasing funding for weapons modernization and taking care of our men and women in uniform
 - we must also renew our commitment to America's diplomacy—every dollar we devote to preventing conflicts, promoting democracy, and stopping the spread of disease and starvation brings with it a sure return in security and savings

2. Describe the theme inherent in the deployment of US military power as exemplified in the NMS.

Summary

Terms embodied in the integrated strategic approach (elements of strategy):

- **Shape**
- **Respond**
- **Prepare Now**

Strategic concepts:

- **Strategic Agility**
- **Overseas Presence**
- **Power Projection**
- **Decisive Force**

Principal among the threats to US security are:

- regional dangers
- asymmetric challenges
- transnational threats
- “wild cards”

National military objectives:

- Promote Peace and Stability
- Defeat Adversaries

Details

Terms embodied in the integrated strategic approach (elements of strategy):

- **Shape** - shaping the international environment through
 - deterrence
 - peacetime engagement activities
 - active participation and leadership in alliances
- **Respond** - responding to full spectrum of crises - military will be called upon to respond to a full range of military operations
 - humanitarian assistance
 - fighting and winning major theater wars
 - conducting concurrent smaller-scale contingencies
- **Prepare Now** - preparing now for an uncertain future
 - imperative that the US maintain the military superiority necessary to our global leadership
 - strategy calls for a transformation of our doctrine and organizations and a stabilized investment program that exploits the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA)

Peacetime military engagement

- encompasses all military activities involving other nations intended to *shape* the security environment in peacetime
- serves to demonstrate our commitment
- improve interoperability
- reassure allies, friends, and coalition partners
- promote transparency
- convey democratic ideals
- deter aggression
- help relieve sources of instability before they can become military crises

Strategic concepts:

- **Strategic Agility** - the timely concentrations, employment and sustainment of US military power anywhere, at our own initiative, and at a speed and tempo that our adversaries cannot match
- **Overseas Presence** - the visible posture of US forces and infrastructure strategically positioned forward, in and near key regions
- **Power Projection** - the ability to rapidly and effectively deploy and sustain US military power in and from multiple dispersed locations until conflict resolution
- **Decisive Force** - the commitment of sufficient military power to overwhelm an adversary, establish new military conditions, and achieve a political resolution favorable to US national interests

National Military Objectives:

- **Promote Peace and Stability** - Our role as a global leader is underscored by US forces performing tasks that encourage other nations to resolve problems through negotiation and compromise rather than by aggression and intimidation
- **Defeat Adversaries** - In the event of an armed conflict, US Armed forces will render an adversary incapable of armed resistance through destruction of his capacity to threaten our interests or by breaking his will to do so

Considerations to guide the use of military force:

- military force should be used judiciously and decisively. Military missions must be clearly stated, with achievable military objectives that support national political aims
- our forces will operate as a joint team on most occasions, harmonizing the unique and complementary strengths and capabilities of each of our Services
- whenever possible, while retaining unilateral capability, we will seek to operate alongside alliance or coalition forces, integrating their capabilities and capitalizing on their strengths
- we must ensure that the conditions necessary for terminating military involvement and withdrawing military forces are clearly established

Elements of strategy: *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now*

- **Shaping the International Environment**
 - US Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement
 - **promoting stability**
 - through peacetime engagement activities, US Armed Forces promote regional stability, increase the security of allies and friends, build coalitions, and ensure a more secure global environment
 - examples: international exercise program, information sharing, wide range of contacts between our military and the defense establishments of other nations
 - **preventing or reducing conflicts and threats**
 - conflict prevention means the reduction, mitigation, or neutralization of the causes of conflict
 - military forces can use their unique operational and logistical capabilities to help civil initiatives succeed
 - includes arms control measures - military resources are an important component of this effort, particularly in the conduct of reciprocal inspections, verification, and in some case, enforcement activities
 - **peacetime deterrence**
 - deterrence means preventing potential adversaries from taking aggressive actions that threaten our interests, allies, partners, or friends.
 - this is the military's most important contribution to the shaping element of the President's strategy
 - deterrence rests in large part on our demonstrated ability and willingness to defeat potential adversaries and deny them their strategic objectives
 - critical elements of deterrence are our conventional warfighting capabilities
 - forces and equipment strategically positioned
 - our capability to rapidly project and concentrate military power worldwide
 - our ability to form and lead effective military coalitions
 - our capacity to protect our homeland, forces, and critical infrastructure from the full range of potential threats
 - our strategic nuclear forces complement our conventional capabilities

- **Responding to the Full Spectrum of Crises**
 - **detering coercion or aggression in crisis**
 - the first response in any crisis normally consists of steps to deter an adversary to the situation does not require a greater US response
 - generally involves signaling our commitment by enhancing our warfighting capability in a theater or by making declaratory statements to communicate US intentions and the potential cost of aggression to an adversary
 - **Fighting and Winning Major Theater Wars**
 - US must be able to deter and defeat nearly simultaneous, large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames
 - this capability is of critical importance as it helps deter opportunism, promote stability, and provide the depth and flexibility to deal with unanticipated challenges
 - minimize the amount of territory we and our allies must regain from aggressors
 - **Conducting Multiple, Concurrent Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations**
 - swift action by military forces may sometimes be the best way to prevent, contain, or resolve conflict, thereby precluding greater effort and increased risk later
 - capacity to perform shows of force, limited strikes, opposed interventions, no-fly zone and sanctions enforcement operations, interposition or observation operations, and other missions allows us to deter would-be aggressors and control the danger posed by rogue states
 - can perform peace operations and humanitarian assistance operations, and can evacuate noncombatants from dangerous situations, whether opposed or unopposed
- **Preparing Now for an Uncertain Future**
 - imperative that the US maintain the military superiority essential to our global leadership
 - success demands a stabilized investment program in robust modernization that exploits the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)
 - it also requires fundamental reengineering of our infrastructure and streamlining of our support structures through Revolution in Business Affairs (RBA) to realize the cost efficiencies necessary to recapitalize the force
 - **information superiority**
 - information superiority is the capability to collect, process, and disseminate an uninterrupted flow of precise and reliable information, while exploiting or denying an adversary's ability to do the same
 - **technological innovation**
 - we will leverage emerging technologies to enhance the capabilities of our service members through development of new doctrine, organizations, materiel, and training
 - **balanced evolution**
 - the fundamental challenge for our Armed Forces is to shape and respond in the current and near-term security environment, while we concurrently prepare for the future

The Joint Force

- Characteristics of a Full Spectrum Force
 - multi-mission capable
 - joint
 - interoperable
- Today's force
 - Posture
 - Readiness
 - Capabilities
 - strategic deterrence
 - decisive operations
 - special operations
 - forcible entry
 - force protection
 - countering weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
 - focused logistics
 - information operations
- Strategic enablers
 - People
 - Robust all-source intelligence
 - Global command and control
 - Air and sea control
 - Space control
 - Strategic mobility

3. Explain 'Halt Phase Strategy' and discuss the USAF contribution to the NMS.

Explain 'Halt Phase Strategy'

(pg. 260-261) Proponents of Halt advocate using joint air power as the primary or supported force in the first few days of a conflict. This strategy would be especially critical in a second major theater of war (MTW) when American ground forces are already heavily committed to a first theater. It would also be viable as a response to the primary aggression if the aggressor attacked with mechanized forces across open terrain. Halt proponents claim that air power can stop enemy forces short of their objective in about 2 weeks. Once the enemy force has been stopped, the theater CINC can use air power to dominate the battlefield or, if appropriate, attack critical targets in the enemy's rear or homeland, while bringing additional forces into the theater for "countering action" (formerly known as the counteroffensive). If needed at all, a counterattack by land and air forces would be a kind of mopping up operation since the issue would have been decided in the Halt Phase. Halt proponents maintain that this strategy offers a more effective and efficient way of warfighting, one that will save not only American lives but also resources.

(264) The Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine, by contrast, focuses on using air power as the primary force early in a conflict. With superior knowledge and deadly precision, air power, according to Halt advocates, can reduce an attacking enemy to the point that its offensive is stopped, and it is unable to conduct coherent, cohesive operations. Air power causes the enemy force to culminate early in the action, long before significant ground forces arrive to engage the enemy.

Versus the traditional strategy of ground engagement where... While air power plays a key role up front in blunting and even stopping the enemy offensive, ground forces, supported by air forces, deliver the decisive blow in the counter-offensive phase.

In a nutshell... Halt Phase strategy is so named because the war is decided in the “Halt” Phase, i.e., the first action of the war, the stopping action. All else is commentary... er... all else is mopping up and securing the success already brought about by the Air Force’s efforts. Can you say Douhet, Chennault (China, WWII), ...?

Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine has six principal elements (summary)

- Air power can now dominate land forces
- Air forces can arrive on the scene rapidly
- Air power can force an enemy to culminate in days
- Air power can win a decisive victory in a few weeks
- Reliance on air power is morally right and economically efficient
- We have the technology necessary to find virtually all significant targets and to destroy them quickly and efficiently

(275) If air power could do all these things across the broad spectrum of current and anticipated national security threats, Halt might be the right foundation upon which to base a military strategy for the 21st century. It is not that air power advocates have once more promised more than they could possibly deliver, because within certain narrow parameters, Halt might work. Rather, it is that **they have devised an approach to a form of future warfare that is becoming less likely as time goes on.**

My note: Look at the title itself: Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine - seems to me we had some readings that highlighted the danger of confounding and intermingling the concepts of strategy and doctrine... that when you put yourself in a position where your strategy identical with your doctrine, you often will wind up with few strategic options and no imaginative answers to strategic questions.

Critique of the Air Force “we can do it by ourselves” approach (262-3).

In the 51 years of its existence as a separate service, the Air Force has dominated the other services in its scramble for budget dollars. It did so by focusing on technology as the key to fighting war more effectively and with less expenditure in human lives. ... Furthermore, the Air Force, more than any other service, traditionally has focused on the potential of its form of warfare to be “decisive.”

Despite the previously successful rhetoric, the reality is that air power has yet to be the single decisive instrument in any war. Nevertheless, to the uninitiated, the idea that air power can deliver victory quickly and at a lower price in human and economic resources is a seductive one.

USAF contribution to NMS, as laid out in the NMS (pg. 250)

- the total force required to carryout the President's National Security strategy and this supporting military strategy at prudent military risk
- Air Force element includes:
 - total fleet of 187 bombers
 - just over 12 active fighter wing equivalents
 - eight reserve component fighter wing equivalents
 - four National Guard dedicated continental air defense squadrons
 - other forces will be used to handle the US air sovereignty mission
 - currently programmed tanker and airlift fleets

Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine has six principal elements (details)

- **Air power can now dominate land forces**
 - under certain circumstances it can
 - any enemy that masses on open terrain, without organic air defenses such as SAMs and without an air force to cover it, would be vulnerable to attack by air forces like those of the US
 - historically, air forces have not dealt well with forces moving at night, in mountainous terrain, in bad weather or under cover of foliage
 - putting bombs on target at the tactical level, and even succeeding at the operational level, does not translate into strategic victory
 - ground forces have, in fact, won wars in which the opposing side had complete air supremacy over the battlefield (communist victories in two Indochina wars, stalemate in Korea, and Mujahadeen victory in Afghanistan)
- **Air forces can arrive on the scene rapidly**
 - speed and range are significant elements of air power
 - speed at which air power can deploy to a given point on the globe depends on a number of factors
 - what kind of warning will we have? (Iraqi attack on Kuwait had secured initial objectives by the time CONUS-based aircraft would have been somewhere over the Atlantic)
 - bases may not be available in the theater
 - we cannot always count on overflight permission
- **Air power can force an enemy to culminate in days**
 - Halt Strategy/Doctrine puts the culminating point early in the conflict, when air power stops the invading enemy force
 - enemy may masses his forces and move into friendly territory - what would make the enemy force stop? When the attacking force loses the ability to maneuver, it will stop.
 - if attack is carried out by mechanized forces, it is possible to destroy enough vehicles to cause the enemy to doe one of three things: give up, disperse, or dig in.
 - two further issues
 - cultural issues surrounding technology - when technologically inspired "silver bullet" was tried and used effectively, it also seemed to many that a cruel and unusual technology had been unleashed on a "peaceful and peace loving" people.
 - what nation would be so foolish tot structure their armed forces in such a way as to insure their vulnerability to the kind of air attack implicit in the Halt Strategy/Doctrine?
- **Air power can win a decisive victory in a few weeks**
 - historically, air power has yet to be the decisive element in a war
 - historians would argue that while air power played a major role in the war effort, the ability to control sea lines of communication and, ultimately, to control terrain was what proved decisive
 - *historical record is quite clear that when operations are conducted as part of a combined arms force, air power can play a key, even pivotal role, in the outcome*

US National Security Strategy: Introduction

- **Reliance on air power is morally right and economically efficient**
 - Halt proponents claim that because of the capabilities derived from advances in technology, future warfare can both be less bloody and more economically efficient
 - therefore, since we have these capabilities we are morally bound to build forces and derive strategies that will enable us to pursue not only less bloody forms of warfare, but to do so with a defense establishment that is more affordable
 - one of the consequences of relying on Halt strategy would be that in the absence of land forces to fix the aggressor, the enemy would move rapidly into urban areas as a way of negating the technological advantages inherent in precision strike
 - the modern mavens of precision who argue that we will succeed if we kill enough of the enemy force, whether or not their will is broken, need to go reread Clausewitz...
 - the historical record is that neither military technology nor air power has lessened the human and economic costs of war
- **We have the technology necessary to find virtually all significant targets and to destroy them quickly and efficiently**
 - if the target is in the open and not moving, we can find it and hit it (268)
 - we do not yet have the ability to find nearly *every* target on *any* battlefield and destroy them
 - we are only now beginning to deploy airborne and space sensors that can identify, tag, and track moving targets; furthermore, targets that are buried or otherwise concealed remain beyond most of our current capabilities

Deja vu all over again: from the 1950's... A generally held assumption, both in the Air Force and Army, was that is they could fight and win the big war, they could fight and win smaller wars with lesser applications of the same kind of force. Instead of modifying their force structures and changing their doctrines to accommodate limited wars, the services, especially the Air Force, tried to fit limited warfare into their approach for fighting general wars. (287)

Not only would a National security strategy base on the Halt Phase Strategy and Doctrine be operationally narrow, it would be strategically limited in several ways... (288)

- it is totally reactive and ceded the strategic initiative to the enemy
 - it cannot accomplish or even contribute to the vast majority of peacetime engagement activities that can help avoid major conflict
 - it can only handle a limited target set: specifically, mechanized and armored forces operating in open terrain
- Rather than expanding the role of air power, the impact of Halt may well be to make air power narrower in its application. Even if Halt can do everything its advocates claim, it will still be irrelevant for the broader, yet still critical, segments of the conflict spectrum. (289)
- 4. Discuss engagement and the nuances of strategic technique in a changing world order.**

Engagement, selective or otherwise, is the opposite of isolationism. It is to stay involved in the structures, activities, and diplomacy in the part of the world we are interested in. Through engagement, we seek to shape the regional and environments in ways that are in line with our national interests. We remain a positive and present force in the region while not taking over.

The nuances of strategic technique in a changing world order:

- meet regularly and frequently at Deputy National Security Advisor level
- avoid the pitfall of becoming a closed and self-contained decision-making circle - realize that having everyone thinking the same kind of way may limit your vision
- realize that attributes that served US policy well previously may serve us less well in the midst of rapid change (Crowl's question - what's different between then and now?) - virtues may become liabilities
- realize that pre-existing biases that previously have done us little harm may become serious liabilities - outdated or antiquated views of other countries' methods and motives may hamper our ability to move ahead in concert with those countries
- maintain an openness to new and unconventional ideas - in a time of change, unconventional thinking is most needed
-

In Europe:

With a "new world order" more an ambition than a goal that could be achieved in the near term, American diplomacy aimed instead to achieve a set of more practical and specific immediate objectives. (308)

US approaches proceeded from the guiding principles that the US had to remain in Europe to balance Russian power and provide stability so that a more united western Europe could extend its zone of democratic stability eastward. Our presence was also needed to help organize a durable post-Cold War order in which former adversaries were brought into a new system of cooperative security. (308)

From these core principles several axioms followed: (308)

- NATO had to survive the demise of the threat it was formed to counter; only institution capable of providing for the collective defense; US forces had to remain in reduced but significant numbers
- NATO's role in post-Cold War Europe called for its radical transformation—internally towards a new balance of European and American roles; externally by extending the Atlantic community eastward; existentially by adapting itself to the newly emerging security challenges in Europe
- the radical reduction of nuclear and conventional forces in Europe
 - in such a way that did not introduce new instabilities and insecurities
 - so that Russian forces did not become even more preponderant in a less militarized Europe
 - so that European military capacity and readiness were appropriate to the new kinds of threats on the horizon
- US needed to embrace European unity, including development of a common foreign and security policy, while also maintaining the indivisibility of transatlantic security
- CSCE (Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe) needed the institutional and operational capacity to play a stronger political role and assume new security responsibilities, particularly in the areas of conflict prevention and crisis management

Policy and process: It was essential to have a regular White House forum such as the European strategy steering group to consider issues. This group met regularly at undersecretary level from the NSC, State and Defense, including JCS; and was chaired by the Deputy National Security Advisor. (309)

Questions for Study and Discussion:

1. If our six strategic points will get us into the 21st century, is our implementation on target?

Six NSS strategic priorities - reminder

- Foster a peaceful, undivided, democratic Europe
- Forge a strong and stable Asia Pacific community
- Build a new, open trading system for the twenty-first century - one that benefits America and the world
- Keep America the leading force for peace
- Increase cooperation in confronting security threats that disregard national borders
- Strengthen the diplomatic and military tools required to address these challenges

See integrated regional approaches (pg 223ff)

2. Can the employment of US military power be justified in the light of the New World order?

New World Order (300)

- Its principles were drawn from the most basic American principles and interests—democracy, free markets, the rule of law
- Combined the realist's appreciation of the permanence of the power factor in world affairs with the liberal internationalist's recognition that democracies make better partners than dictatorships in building a secure order

3. What is halt phase strategy? Halt phase strategy - see DLO #3

What does Tilford mean by “new wine in old skins”?

Tilford means that what is being proposed by those who are promoting Halt Phase Strategy is nothing new. He points out that if you take all the arguments that were made about nuclear capabilities and deterrence in the 1950's and change the concept to “precision guidance”, they look pretty much identical.

New wine - precision guided munitions

Halt, in its current iteration, is based on a claim that, with air and space-based sensors, anything on a battlefield can be located and then destroyed with precision guided munitions. (263)

- according to Halt advocates, our current strategy is based on the outdated Cold war relationships between manpower and firepower whereby air power and artillery support ground operations. But advances in technology now make it possible to move away from the old way of fighting wars.
- Air Expeditionary Force (AEF) is the vehicle whereby air power can counter aggression across the spectrum (271)

US National Security Strategy: Introduction

Old skins: the Atomic Halt (the names have been change to protect the innocent...)

- (270) With atomic and nuclear technologies of the 1950s, claims that “a new era of warfare” had dawned were as prevalent then as they are today. Col R. C. Richardson III, in a series of articles in 1954 and 1955 in the *AU Quarterly Review*, claimed, “the old concept of a three-phase war—the holding, build-up, and exploitation phase—is dead.” He went on, “The war and decisive phase will hereafter begin at the same time. The next, and last, phase concerns the consolidation of the victors’ conquests in accordance with his objectives; it may or may not require military forces.”
- Composite Air Strike Force (CASF) of the 1950s: all the fighter-bombers and tactical bombers were capable of employing the 1950s technological equivalent of precision strike: atomic and nuclear weapons.

With the roots of Halt and the modern-day AEF evident in the atomic era and the Air Force’s Combined Air Strike Force concept form the 1950s, the Halt Phase Strategy/Doctrine may, indeed, be “new wine in old skins.”

4. In what ways do diplomats engage when the structure itself is radically changed?

Very carefully... with not too much attachment to the past and a strong openness to the future and its uncertainty...

